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In the aftermath of global financial crisis, the importance of effective regulatory
interventions by government has come into sharp relief. The failure of public
administration and political oversight that underwrote the collapse of the Irish
economy in 2008 has provoked widespread reflection on the need for increased
administrative review in the country. This has extended beyond the specific
financial sphere, to broader public law reform targeting executive power by building
an improved parliamentary culture, greater independent oversight and concentrating
democratic participation. In this article, we critique the Irish regulatory state through
the prism of the pressures, conflicts and reforms to the Office of the Ombudsman
over the past decade.
The Office of Ombudsman has been a distinctive nodal point in the interest
conflicts and oppositionalities that marked the past decade in Irish constitutional
and political order.1 In response to the crash, political leaders have promised “root
and branch reform”, with the incoming government appointing Ireland’s first
Minister of State for Public Sector Expenditure and Reform. TheMinister, Brendan
Howlin TD has stated that the aim is for “a new maturity in our approach to
government’s relationship with the citizen”, and to “contribute to opening up the
‘black box’ of government to a much greater degree than heretofore.”2 This
represents an acknowledgement of Ireland’s deep governance crisis, which
underwrote experiences of liberalised financial regulation and a political culture
whose failure to correct property bubbles reflected the predominance of “retail
politics”.3 The Office of the Ombudsman is at the centre of resultant reforms, well
positioned to deliver a “ripple effect for notions of democratic accountability and
the relationship between the citizen and the state”.4
1Throughout this article we focus largely upon the main instance of ombudsmanry in Ireland/the Office of the
Ombudsman.
2B. Howlin, “Reform of the Public Service” (2012) 60(1) Administration 15, 26.
3Trust in government in Ireland fell to just 18% in 2012, see Autumn 2012 Eurobarometer survey at http://ec
.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_anx_en.pdf [Accessed May 2, 2014].
4A. Stuhmcke, “Changing Relations between Government and Citizen: Administrative Law and the work of the
Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman” (2008) Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol.67(3), 321–339,
321.
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While traditional accounts often reductively focus on the Ombudsman as a form
of alternative dispute resolution, increasingly it is regarded as an essential
supplement to the classical branches of judiciary, legislature and executive. This
additional “integrity branch”, first championed by Professor Bruce Ackerman,
seeks to combat the gaps and inertia produced by traditional
judiciary-executive-legislature divisions.5 For Buck, Kirkham and Thompson, the
existence of Ombudsman institutions “provides strong evidence that in the modern
administrative state the institutions of the tripartite model by themselves are
incapable of upholding the full range of values that underpin the constitution”.6
We argue that Irish experiences and reforms endorse these outlooks, and integrity
institutions will be core to future efforts to diversify and re-centre traditional Irish
administrative philosophies.
The Ombudsman and Ireland’s administrative state: heritage
and failings
The institution of the Ombudsman enjoys a prominent place globally as a core
element of constitutional design, of legislative enforcement and in securing
governmental accountability, offering flexible and independent redress. While
unities of nomenclature exist, Ombudsmen bear differing nation-specific emphases,
with some jurisdictions relying upon the office for human rights protection, or
others seeking to employ the institution to improve accessibility to justice. Within
this spectrum, the Irish Office of the Ombudsman combines a number of functions:
• Standard setting for the civil service.
• Investigation power.
• Alternative dispute resolution between complainants and public
sector bodies.
In assessing the impact of the Office and the barriers it faces, it is necessary to
critically reflect on the distinct regulatory philosophies of the Irish public sector
and the State’s constitutional order.
For Irish society, a deeply engrained tradition of clientelism had, historically,
the potential to negate calls for the foundation of the Ombudsman and, more
broadly, any systematised administrative review outside of the courts. This was
most clearly seen in a speech by, then FinanceMinister, Charles Haughey in 1966:
“Ireland is a small compact community. There is hardly anyone without a
direct personal link with someone, be he Minister, T.D., clergyman, county
or borough councillor or trade union official, who will interest himself in
helping a citizen to have a grievance examined and, if possible, remedied…The
basic reason therefore why we do not need an official Ombudsman is because
we already have so many unofficial but nevertheless effective ones.”7
5 See B. Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113(3) Harvard Law Review 694–696.
6T. Buck, R. Kirkham and B. Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice, (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010), p.18.
7AsMr Haughey was not able to attend the event, held by the Solicitors’ Apprentices Debating Society, the speech
was read by the Secretary to the Department of Finance, T. K. Whitaker. “We do not need an Ombudsman says
Whitaker: T.D.s extremely assiduous” Irish Times, November 12, 1966, p.11.
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Professor John Kelly heavily criticised this statement as promoting “the primitive
system of clientship and patronage”. He argued that:
“this phenomenon was, in the distant past, a sure sign of a society where a
weak man had no hope of justice without the aid of a strong one, and its
general replacement in civilised countries by a regular, strong, and impartial
process of law is a major social milestone.”8
A further feature of the Irish regulatory landscape has been the failure of
parliamentary structures to effectively oversee executive actions. This challenges
the traditionalWestminster model tenet that “Parliament is the place for ventilating
the grievances of the citizen”.9 Former chair of the Committee of Public Accounts,
Gay Mitchell acknowledged that the Oireachtas and its Committees had not, in
general, been effective in holding the Executive and state agencies accountable
and that the spate of tribunals of inquiry in recent years underlined the weakness
of parliamentary structures.10
In 2011, attempts to pass a constitutional amendment to empower the Oireachtas
to establish full parliamentary inquiries into matters of general public importance,11
failed in the face of a public who are fundamentally distrustful of their political
representatives. The idea that the powers of the Oireachtas should be strengthened12
offering an effective Parliamentary forum for in-depth examinations of key issues
such as the banking scandals provided initial public support for this reform proposal.
However, in a referendum required to pass the amendment, a majority rejected a
poorly worded provision that, rather than encouraging public confidence in
politicians, tended to provoke distrust. The offending section was found in the
proposed art.15.10.4 which stated:
“It shall be for the House or Houses concerned to determine, with due regard
to the principles of fair procedures, the appropriate balance between the rights
of persons and the public interest for the purposes of ensuring an effective
inquiry …”
This triggered a significant NO campaign involving lawyers, NGOs and
academics who regarded it as a limit to judicial supervision of such inquiries,
particularly on the basis of constitutional justice and the right to reputation. The
vote, thus, represented a demand for proper political reform rather than a rejection
of political reform per se.
The difficulty of drawing lines of accountability at the interface of
administrative-ministerial roles has complicated oversight. The Programme for
Government 2011 indicated a wish to reformulate the Public ServiceManagement
8As quoted by the Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly at the Free Legal Advice Centres 2006 Conference, “Public Interest
Law in Ireland—the Reality and the Potential” at http://www.flac.ie/download/pdf/flac_pil_proceedings_final.pdf
[Accessed May 2, 2014].
9The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration,White Paper, Cm.2767, October 1965 para.4.
10G. Mitchell, By Dáil Account: Auditing of Government, Past, Present and Future, (Dublin: Institute of Public
Administration, 2010).
11A constitutional amendment was required following a decision of the Supreme Court inMaguire and Ors v
Ardagh [2002] 1 I.R. 385 which ruled that the Oireachtas has no inherent power to hold inquiries that can make
findings which adversely affect the reputation of individuals. The power is reserved to its legislative functions.
12M. Marsh, J. Suiter and T. Reidy, Report on Reasons Behind Voter Behaviour in the Oireachtas Inquiry
Referendum 2011, (2012) at http://per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/OIReferendum-Report-Final-2003-corrected.pdf
[Accessed May 2, 2014].
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Act 1997, to clarify the doctrine of the minister as corporation sole in a modern
governmental context.13 In relation to Ireland’s Health Services Executive, there
have been parliamentary tensions regarding the transparency of decisions and the
degree to which a rigid policy/implementation separation insulates civil servants
from taking responsibility. Minister Howlin has acknowledged: “what is needed
here is clarity—who is responsible for what within the complex public
administrative system”.14
The Civil Service has also been identified as suffering from key failings,
particularly a tendency towards elite integration between regulators and those
regulated.15 The receptivity of the Irish administrative state to “principles based
regulation” reflected an affinity with discretion and unproblematised trust in
self-regulation. In 2008, the OECD noted the existence of an insular administrative
culture it described as “most similar to the village life type model” with politicians
and bureaucrats being “jointly socialised”, with “informal networks” where
“information tends to circulate outside of traditional formal communication
channels.”16
Accompanying these flaws is an overarching need for greater reflection upon
Ireland’s administrative review system. Regulatory mechanisms have, over the
years, developed through piecemeal responses resulting in individualised reform
without a wider understanding of the overall system. The haphazard landscape of
tribunals, appeals, commissioners and Boards results in Ireland’s administrative
review system remaining overly reliant on judicial review, having thus far failed
to embracemerits based appeals on amore systematised basis. Evenwhere systemic
reforms do occur, the enforced obsolescence of United Kingdom’s Administrative
Justice and Tribunals Council indicates how centrifugal reform forces can coalesce
to offer partial innovation only for it to be swept back by the tides of administrative
convenience and political expediency.
Despite these governance challenges, the Office of the Ombudsman has
developed a rich typology of maladministration offering an established reservoir
of discourse and practice to draw upon in rebalancing Ireland’s administrative
state and governance networks. At the same time, the relationship of the Office
with political and administrative actors underlines countervailing forces, which
could undermine such progress.
The history of the Ombudsman in Ireland
The first steps towards the creation of an Ombudsman in Ireland are found in the
formative Devlin Report 1969.17 The relevant sub-group identified the possibility
of establishing aCommissioner for Administrative Justice. However, the Committee
13Taoiseach, Programme for Government 2011 (2011). Taoiseach.gov at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng
/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Programme_for_Government_2011.pdf [Accessed May 2,
2014].
14Howlin, “Reform of the Public Service” (2012) 60(1) Administration 15, 26.
15 Such regulatory capture was seen in the interrelationship of the Central Bank, the Irish Financial Services
Regulatory Authority and the banking industry. See R. Chari and P. Bernhagen, “Financial and Economic Crisis:
Explaining the Sunset over the Celtic Tiger” (2011) 26(4) Irish Political Studies 473–88.
16Organisational for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Public Management Reviews:
Ireland—Towards an Integrated Public Service, (OECD Publishing, 2008), p.264.
17Public Services Organisation Review Group, Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group (Dublin:
The Stationery Office, 1969), p.792.
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regarded such a body as ill-matching the country’s administrative tradition,
reflecting the prevalent fear of diluting Ministerial authority and accountability
over departmental affairs. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman model became more
established globally during the 1970s and by 1977, an All-Party Committee on
Administrative Justice recommended establishing an Ombudsman. Although the
Ombudsman Act was passed in 1980, the incoming Fianna Fáil Government was
less enthusiastic, with the result that it did not come into force until 1984 under a
new Fine Gael/Labour Party Coalition.
Initial political mistrust of the Ombudsman was reflected in two early crises.
First, when Fianna Fáil returned to Government in 1987 it dramatically reduced
the budget of the Office as part of wider public sector funding cuts.18 The first
Ombudsman, Michael Mills,19 regarded this as a political attack on the Office and
countered by presenting a special report to the Oireachtas attesting that further
budget cuts would lead to the closure of the office.20 Although the budget situation
was resolved when the Department of Finance undertook a review, a second crisis
arose as the first six year term21 of Michael Mills drew to a close in 1989. Only on
the last day before the Dáil rose for the Christmas break did the Finance Minister
recommend extending Mills’ appointment for a second term. Without this action,
his appointment would have lapsed at the start of 1990 and he would have been
too old to satisfy the legislative criteria for a new appointment.22
The resilience of the Ombudsman during these early years may ultimately be
traced to both its credibility amongst the public and the significant legislative
provisions that enhanced the independence of the office. Appointment to, and
removal from, the post is made by the President, following a joint resolution of
the Dáil and the Seanad.23 Section 4(1) of the Act formally enshrines the general
principle that “The Ombudsman shall be independent in the performance of his
functions”. The Office does not have constitutional status however, and conflicts
between the Office, Government and Civil Service outlined later in this article,
highlight that this is a significant institutional constraint on the Office.
The institutional remit of the Ombudsman
The political tensions underlying the Office’s foundation also manifested
themselves in the circumscribed ambit of its purview. The body was focused
initially only upon central civil service administration—with jurisdiction over local
authorities, state sponsored bodies and health boards only being incrementally
acquired later.24 Each body had to be expressly added to its jurisdiction, which
given the ad hoc sprawl of agencies with discrete functions, “termed semi-state
bodies”, encouraged pragmatic exclusions. As early as 1980, Barrington identified
18The Ombudsman was regarded as disproportionately affected. In 1987, the Office’s budget was cut by 20%
(IR£100,000) with the loss of 5 staff. In 1988, the cut was repeated with similar staffing impacts.
19M.Mills,Hurler on the Ditch: Memoir of a Journalist who Became Ireland’s First Ombudsman, (Dublin: Currach
Press, 2006), pp.142–47.
20Mills, Hurler on the Ditch, p.145. Ombudsman Act s.6(7) empowers the Ombudsman to submit a report to the
Oireachtas regarding the Office’s functions.
21A term set down by the Ombudsman Act s.2(4).
22Mills, Hurler on the Ditch, pp.147–50.
23OmbudsmanAct 1980 s.2(2). Grounds for removal are statedmisbehaviour, incapacity and bankruptcy—s.2(3)(b).
24Ombudsman Act (First Schedule) (Amendment) Order 1984 (SI 332/1984). The extension came into force in
April 1, 1985.
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over four hundred semi-state bodies,25 and the OECD more recently criticised the
resulting fragmentation of public service accountability and performance.26 Only
in late 2012 did the Government finally legislate to catch up to the creep of bodies
outside the purview of Ombudsman review. The Ombudsman (Amendment) Act
2012 provided for the automatic inclusion of all public bodies, except those
specifically excluded.27
To guard against duplication, the Act continues to prima facie exclude
jurisdiction where there is a right to judicial review, statutory appeal or appeal to
an independent body. In these instances, however, the Ombudsman may proceed
with the investigation “where special circumstances make it proper to do so”.28
Such circumstances arose in the 2001 Passengers with Disabilities Report, where
the Ombudsman justified her examination because of the limited scope of the
available independent appeal and the significant difficulties faced by the carers in
the specific cases.29 Thus the Office retains an ability to ameliorate faults with
existing mechanisms.
Despite the recent jurisdictional reforms, it is significant that specific exclusions
continue in areas long regarded as administratively sensitive. The Department of
Justice has lobbied successfully to remain outside the Ombudsman’s purview in
relation to the actions of An Garda Siochana, the administration of the law relating
aliens and naturalisation procedures and the administration of prisons. In the latter
two areas, alternative mechanisms have been proposed: a complaints system for
prisoners is being developed30 and a new statutory appeals system has been promised
under the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010. Nevertheless, contrary
to a large number of comparative jurisdictions, both remain insulated from the
already effective Ombudsman system. The Ombudsman has warned that these
processes “must be robust and truly independent if they are to provide a genuine
alternative to Ombudsman oversight.”31
There is, finally, a Ministerial exclusion power contained in Ombudsman Act
s.5(3). Deriving from earlier political anxieties, it allows a Minister to request that
the Ombudsman not investigate a matter concerning their department or related
functions. The request must include reasons as to why it is beingmade. On receiving
the request, the Ombudsman is obliged to cease investigation.32 Although this
power has not yet been used, it embodies a latent mistrust of the Office which as
we will show, has manifested itself in recent controversies.
25T. J. Barrington, The Irish Administrative System (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration), 1980.
26Organisational for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Public Management Reviews: Ireland —
Towards an Integrated Public Service.
27Over 100 State Agencies were added, including two particularly controversial bodies, the National Roads
Authority and FAS (the State employment training body). Ombudsman (Amendment) Act 2012 First Schedule.
28Ombudsman Act [s.5(1)(a)(i)–(ii)].
29Office of the Ombudsman, Passengers with Disabilities (Special report) (Dublin: Office of the Ombudsman,
2001), p.16. All Ombudsman reports referenced in this article are at http://m.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/Publications
/Investigation-Reports/ [Accessed May 2, 2014].
30 See Justice.ie, http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR13000019 [Accessed May 2, 2014].
31Ombudsman Address to the Oireachtas Public Services Oversight and Petitions Committee, October 10, 2012
at http://www.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/news/speeches-articles/2012/ombudsman-amendment-bill-and-2011-annual
-report.html [Accessed May 2, 2014].
32Ministerial requests must be included in the Ombudsman’s Annual Report to the Oireachtas. Ombudsman Act
1980 s.6(7).
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Ireland’s “Ombudsman Dividend”33: enhancing administrative
justice
The Ombudsman’s Office, we argue, has proved successful in developing a
conception of administrative justice, which offers a systematised corrective to
Ireland’s administrative flaws. Across a number of thematic areas, the Office offers
a counterpoint to the more deferential, authority-focused and individualistic avenue
of judicial review.
Evolving standards of good governance
The Irish Ombudsman has supplemented traditional administrative law through
active definition and application of the concept of maladministration. The yardstick
the Ombudsman applies to complaints is defined in s.4(2) of the 1980 Ombudsman
Act. This lists seven grounds for finding a “defect” in an administrative decision,
namely where it is:
• Taken without proper authority;
• Taken on irrelevant grounds;
• The result of negligence or carelessness;
• Based on erroneous or irrelevant considerations;
• Improperly discriminatory (this was later linkedwith the Equal Status
Act 2000);
• Based on undesirable administrative practice; and
• Otherwise Contrary to sound or fair administration.
The legislation makes no reference to maladministration, but its non-exhaustive
definition of a defect clearly encompasses much of that wider category.34
The openness echoes the initial Ombudsman creating legislation in the United
Kingdom—Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967—which left the term
maladministration35 undefined. In parliamentary debate of that Bill, the Leader of
the House of Commons, Richard Crossman, set out what was to become known
as the “Crossman catalogue”:
“A positive definition of maladministration is far more difficult to achieve.
We might have made an attempt in this Clause to define … all the qualities
which make upmaladministration… It would be a wonderful exercise—bias,
neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inaptitude, perversity, turpitude,
arbitrariness and so on. It would be a long and interesting list.”36
Crossman ultimately concluded that the meaning of maladministration would
be filled out organically by case work. Thus, though these examples grew into
conventional indicia, Sir William Reid, in his 1993 Annual Report of the
Ombudsman, adopted a progressive interpretation of maladministration to include
33A. Abraham, “The Ombudsman as Part of the UK Constitution: A Contested Role” (2008) 61 Parliamentary
Affairs 206–215, 212.
34G. Hogan and D. G. Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland, 4th edn (Dublin: Round Hall, 2010), p.400.
35 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 s.5(1).
36Hansard, HC Debs, October 18, 1966, vol.734 col.51.
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further elements such as “unwillingness to treat the complainant as a person with
rights” or “offering no redress”.37
Maladministration therefore runs the spectrum from judicial review grounds to
more open-textured concepts of good governance of administration. The yardstick
applied by the Irish Office received its most sustained examination in the Redress
for Taxpayers Special Report.38 First, the Office noted that in interpreting “contrary
to fair or sound administration” regard is had to the principles developed by the
Irish courts as well as to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
HumanRights. Also relied upon are the principles of good administration developed
by international bodies such as the Council of Europe “which the State has
accepted”, which, though not enshrined in domestic statute, reflect “similar
principles developed in the Irish Courts.”39 Finally, subject to the avoidance of
conflict with the courts, her Office may develop “incrementally … rules of good
practice the infringement of which … would be “contrary to fair or sound
administration.”40
The interplay between fair administration and human rights protections is also
a significant development in Ombudsmanry generally. Whilst the Irish Office has
been circumspect in employing rights language, human rights are part of its review
process.41 Thus the Annual Report of 2000 laid out the “background rights” that
underlie the decision making powers of public bodies, identifying five “core values
governing the state/citizen relationship”, namely “the need to uphold the autonomy,
dignity, respect, status and security of individuals.”42The civil service’s internalising
of such norms through its commitment to developing “a human rights approach
to service provision”,43 has deepened the Ombudsman’s mandate for their use as
legitimate expectation of the citizen. In addition, the Office has made constructive
use of soft law, for example in the tax context the Ombudsman has relied upon
the Revenue Commissioners’ stated internal best practices to mitigate hardship.44
The shading of the Ombudsman Act standards from a legal through to an
administrative fairness orientation has conflicted with more minimalist, legalistic
mindsets within Government departments. In a 1997 Report on her investigation
of three complaints involving late claims for contributory pensions, the Ombudsman
noted that the Department of Finance’s response “at all stages has been to say that
the impugned decisions are taken into accordance with the law.”45 Underlying this
was a civil service inference that “it is not open to the Ombudsman to be critical
37 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Third Report 1993–94 (London: HMSO, 1994), para.7.
38Office of the Ombudsman, Redress for Taxpayers (Special Report) (Dublin: Office of the Ombudsman, 2002),
p.8.
39Office of the Ombudsman, Redress for Taxpayers (Special Report) (Dublin: Office of the Ombudsman, 2002),
p.8.
40Office of the Ombudsman, Redress for Taxpayers (Special Report) (Dublin: Office of the Ombudsman, 2002),
p.8.
41Emily O’Reilly, as Ombudsman, reflected upon the relationship between maladministration and human rights
law in a 2007 speech to the British and Irish Ombudsman Association at: http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org
/docs/HumanRightsOmbudsmanEmilyOReilly.pdf [Accessed May 2, 2014].
42Office of the Ombudsman, Annual Report of the Ombudsman 2000 (Dublin, Office of the Ombudsman, 2001),
p.13, quoting Dawn Oliver in “The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law” in M. Taggart (ed.) The Province
of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997).
43Office of the Ombudsman, Annual Report of the Ombudsman 2000 (2001), p.13.
44Office of the Ombudsman, Redress for Taxpayers (Special Report) (Dublin: Office of the Ombudsman, 2002),
p.10.
45Office of the Ombudsman, Investigatory Report on the non-payment of arrears of contributory pensions (Dublin:
Office of the Ombudsman, 1997), para.12.
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of decisions taken in accordancewith law”.46TheOmbudsmanAct however, clearly
permits “an action to be taken with “proper authority” to be found “contrary to
fair and sound administration”.47 This position echoes that of the UK Parliamentary
Ombudsman in her Special Report on Military Detainees, a Debt of Honour: The
ex gratia scheme for British groups interned by the Japanese during the Second
World war, where her critique of a rushed, poor quality decision-making process
and the justifiable expectations raised by the Parliamentary announcement of the
scheme was eventually accepted by the Ministry for Defence.48
Obtaining systemic redress
Beyond the provision of specific remedies, the Ombudsman has displayed an
ability to change administrative practice. Such a systemic approach is of distinctive
value to common law systems, as Ann Abraham argues:
“It is the sort of function to which the common lawmentality with its inherent
individualism is a stranger, constrained from looking beyond the facts of the
particular case, compelled invariably to resort to a simplistic ‘rotten apple’
theory of organisational malfunction instead of a more realistic analysis that
makes room for systemic and institutional failure”49
Nevertheless, the engagement of the Irish Ombudsman with systemic reform
has been the primary source of conflict between the Office and Government.
Generally, systemic redress has arisen where the Ombudsman has exercised her
“own initiative” power of investigation under s.4(3)(b) of the Ombudsman Act
which allows for an investigation where it appears “having regard to all the
circumstances, that an investigation under this section into the action would be
warranted.” Such investigations are informed by individual complaints received
and often result in a consolidation of numerous complaints into a more systemic
investigation. The investigation of the right to nursing home care which resulted
in the Who Cares Report50 is such an example. The investigation was “prompted
by a persistent stream of complaints to the Ombudsman”51 and provided a broader
analysis of the problems than could be undertaken in response to individual
complaints.
The mandate to engage in systematic redress was contested in a case relating
to late claims for contributory pensions by insured people.52 The relevant
Department argued that as Ministerial regulations prescribed the relevant time
limit for making claims, it had no discretion, unless it was at fault for the delay.
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation, finding that s.4(2)
of the Ombudsman Act 1980 referred to actions, “taken in the performance of
46Office of the Ombudsman, Investigatory Report on the non-payment of arrears of contributory pensions (1997),
para.12.
47Ombudsman Act 1980 s.4.
48Fourth Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration HC 324 (London: TSO, 2005) (2004–5),
paras 132–133.
49Abraham, “The Ombudsman as Part of the UKConstitution: A Contested Role” (2008) 61 Parliamentary Affairs
206–215, 210.
50Office of the Ombudsman,Who Cares? An investigation into the right to nursing home care in Ireland (Dublin,
Office of the Ombudsman, 2010).
51Office of the Ombudsman,Who Cares? An investigation into the right to nursing home care in Ireland (2010),
p.5.
52Office of the Ombudsman, Investigatory Report on the non-payment of arrears of contributory pensions (1997).
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administrative functions”, not inquiring into legislative actions. She defined a
legislative action as “the making of a law; it is not the application of that law to
individual cases or categories of cases”.53Consequently, she could criticise statutory
regulations as ultra vires the primary legislation, as these would be “without proper
authority.” The Ombudsman also found that she could criticise intra vires
regulations that were producing an adverse, i.e. unfair and unreasonable, effect
where the result was “contrary to fair or sound administration”.
Under Irish constitutional law regulations are called into existence only by the
primary Act, and the Minister may not therefore be a law-maker as such, only
possessing the power to put into effect the Oireachtas’ “principles and policies”.54
The Minister is further bound by an obligation to act “with basic fairness,
reasonableness and good faith”.55 Removing the power of recommending
amendment from theOmbudsman, which has not occurred in the UnitedKingdom,56
would lessen the ability of the Office to challenge entrenched, regulation-facilitated
unfairness. As part of the “integrity branch”, the Ombudsman, as an agent directly
responsive to the people, can concentrate democratic oversight over technocratic
instruments that are usually simply laid before the Dáil without any motion.
Mediating compliance and dialogue
The resistance seen in the contributory pensions case moves us towards assessing
the overall compliance by relevant public bodies with the Office. The Ombudsman
exists to enhance flexibility and accessibility, and in the Irish context, both the
necessary legislation and practical co-operation have had to be actively fought for.
Legally, Ombudsman Act 1980 s.7(1)(a) allows the Office to:
“… for the purposes of a preliminary examination… require any person who
in the opinion of the Ombudsman, is in possession of information … that is
relevant to the examination … to furnish that information … and, where
appropriate, may require the person to attend before him for that purpose and
the person shall comply with the requirements.”
Those involved in an investigation “shall not … obstruct or hinder the
Ombudsman in the performance of his functions”.57 The 2012 Amendment Act
now allows the Ombudsman to enforce cooperation by making an application for
a Circuit Court order directing a person to cooperate where they have failed to do
so.58
53Office of the Ombudsman, Investigatory Report on the non-payment of arrears of contributory pensions (1997),
para.13.
54Article 15.2.1° of the Irish Constitution states:
“The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative
authority has power to make laws for the State.”
Where principles and policies are not present to guide Minister discretion then the delegation of power by the
Oireachtas is likely to be unconstitutional, as per the Irish Supreme Court in Cityview Press Ltd v An Comhairle
Oiliúna [1980] I.R. 381.
55Burke v Minister for Labour [1979] I.R. 354.
56 In the UK, the Parliamentary Commissioner was encouraged by the Standing Committee in Parliament to regard
the content and potential amendment of regulations as within jurisdiction.
57Ombudsman Act 1980 s.7(3).
58Ombudsman (Amendment) Act 2012 inserting s.7(1) (c) and (d).
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The flexible Ombudsman procedure can offer unique benefits over court
litigation, as seen in the 2003 Beaumont Hospital Cancer Case.59 As a result of
treatment failures, a patient admitted to the hospital was misdiagnosed, did not
receive adequate follow-up consultations and died ten days after admission. Under
internal complaint procedures, an independent review team produced a report in
2007. The family, however, considered the report to have misrepresented their
experience and unsuccessfully requested its amendment. In her 2009 Annual
Report, the Ombudsman noted that the complainant (the man’s daughter) withdrew
legal proceedings so as to pursue the Ombudsman investigation. This wasmotivated
by a desire for “clear answers with regard to her late father’s treatment, an apology
for the shortcomings in his treatment and assurances that lessons had been learned
within the hospital system.”60 It appears the complainant’s view was that the
adversarial and costly nature of litigation endangered these outcomes. The Office
of the Ombudsman facilitated a number of meetings with senior hospital personnel;
these were then followed up by a detailed written apology acknowledging
communication andmedical treatment failures. The complaint resulted in Beaumont
Hospital establishing a new system that sought to ensure a clearer division of
responsibilities between consultants on duty, which the Ombudsman described as
representing “considerable progress” in providing “continuous and consistent
care”.61
Conflicts withGovernment and theOmbudsman’s independence
Despite the discussion thus far highlighting positive developments in relation to
the powers and operation of the Ombudsman, there have been instances of tension
and outright rejection of the Ombudsman’s role and competence, extending even
to the legislature. This is highly significant as an Ombudsman’s ability to report
to a receptive Parliament represents, as Kirkham argues “the cutting edge” of its
power and “a gauge of the effectiveness of the office and its continuing ability to
secure redress”.62
The direct conflict with the Health Service Executive (“HSE”) in 2008, when
the Irish Ombudsmanmade findings of systematicmaladministration in the delaying
of payments under guardianship and foster parent schemes, is therefore troubling.
The HSE contested the investigation report as beyond the powers of the
Ombudsman and threatened legal action, including applying for an injunction to
prevent the report being presented to the Oireachtas. Litigation was ultimately not
pursued, however theOmbudsman incurred significant costs in requesting necessary
legal opinions.63 In its final response, the HSE rejected the report’s
recommendations. These had been that the relevant agencies should be paid
outstanding fees plus interest and “time and trouble” payments, and that in future
the HSE should “engage openly with guardian agencies to ensure that such disputes
59Office of the Ombudsman, 2009 Annual Report, p.62.
60Office of the Ombudsman, 2009 Annual Report, p.62.
61Office of the Ombudsman, 2009 Annual Report, p.62.
62R. Kirkham, “Challenging the Authority of the Ombudsman: the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Special report
on Wartime Detainees” (2006) 69(5) M.L.R. 792, 813.
63The Ombudsman Office costs were €52,000, while the total cost to all parties was estimated to be €150,000.
Office of the Ombudsman,Gagging the Ombudsman? Aftermath of an Investigation by the Ombudsman of the Health
Service Executive (Dublin, Office of the Ombudsman, 2010).
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would not arise again.” Significantly, despite the rejection and the related legal
posturing, the HSE later gave effect to the recommendations.64
In a comparative context, Kirkham notes that no UKGovernment has attempted
judicial review of the Ombudsman’s reports, though local councils disputing local
authority Ombudsman findings have done so. Furthermore, rejection of
Ombudsman’s reports is exceedingly rare and never unqualified.65 As a former
UK Ombudsman has noted rejections are highly significant:
“there would be no point in having an Ombudsman if the Government were
to show disregard for his Office, his standing as an impartial referee, and for
the thoroughness of this investigation.”66
In the Irish context, we find situations not only where a public body has rejected
the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction or recommendations, but also where the Government
has supported that rejection. This occurred in 2010/11, when the Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and the Marine was backed by the Government in refusing
to accept the recommendations that a €200,000 payout be made to a family who
had been refused assistance under the Lost at Sea Scheme. The Ombudsman found
that the design and operation of the schemewere contrary to sound administration.
The Fianna Fail/Green Party Government vetoed an Oireachtas debate on the
Ombudsman’s Report and subsequently an Oireachtas committee voted to ignore
it on instructions from the Government whip. By failing to facilitate debate, the
Ombudsman argued that the:
“Government were knowingly disempowering the office, potentially robbing
it of its ability to make public bodies accountable and to secure redress for
people badly served by the State. 67”
In a speech shortly after these events, the Ombudsman accepted the
Government’s right to reject the Report, but argued that such a rejection required
a fair hearing.68 In the event, media reaction was such that an Oireachtas committee
did debate the Report, although the government-controlled committee predictably
rejected the findings and recommendations. The incident underlines the ability of
party politics to overpower Irish legislative oversight. The former UKParliamentary
Ombudsman, Sir Cecil Clothier, in contrast, felt he could be confident in:
“[t]he Commissioner’s report had no party implications; the House tended to
be united in demanding explanations from the department in a highly public
manner.”69
Also in 2010, both the Health Services Executive and the Department of Health
refused to co-operate with the Ombudsman’s Report on the right to nursing home
care in Ireland, denying her access to relevant information to assist the investigation.
Echoing previous claims, they submitted that the Ombudsman did not have the
64Office of the Ombudsman, Gagging the Ombudsman? Aftermath of an Investigation by the Ombudsman of the
Health Service Executive (2010), p.9.
65Kirkham, “Challenging the Authority of the Ombudsman” (2006), 813.
66 Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Sixth Report: The Channel Tunnel
Rail Link and Exceptional Hardship, HC 270 (1994–95).
67E. O’Reilly, “Watchdog needs State guarantee” The Sunday Times, June 5, 2011.
68O’Reilly, “Watchdog Needs State Guarantee” The Sunday Times, June 5, 2011.
69C. Clothier, ‘Fact-finding in Inquiries—the PCA’s perspective’ [1996] Public Law 384, 388–389.
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power to make broad systemic findings and that she was prejudicing ongoing legal
actions. While the Government expressly backed this position, no legal action
challenging the publication of the report was taken. The Ombudsman Report,
published at the end of 2010, stressed that the jurisdictional challenge was:
“… the most serious mounted against the Ombudsman’s Office since its
establishment in 1984. The extent and nature of this challenge, occurring both
at the outset of the investigation and at the stage of representations on the
draft report, does raise serious issues for the Ombudsman as she goes about
discharging her independent role.”70
What is clear is that the relationship between the government and the
Ombudsman Office in 2010/11 had reached a low level, akin to that which existed
during the 1987 budget cuts outlined earlier.
Relations between the Ombudsman and Government have not necessarily
improved even following a change of political leadership in 2011. The launch of
an investigative report entitled “Too Old to Be Equal” occurred after the election
of the new Fine Gael/Labour Party Government.71 This found that the Mobility
Allowance scheme run by the Department of Health to benefit those with a disability
was in breach of the Equal Status Act 2000 because of a bright line age restriction
of the benefit to those under 66 years old. Further, in an example of administrative
inconsistency, the Report found that people who had been receiving Mobility
Allowance before reaching the age of 66 did not have their allowance payments
discontinued after they passed this age. The Ombudsman underlined that the
Department of Health was aware of the illegality of the upper age limit, but that
it had shown no “sense of urgency” to make the scheme compatible 11 years after
the legislation had been passed, despite having received warnings from the Equality
Authority. In advocating systemic change, the Ombudsman recommended that the
Department review the scheme and revise it “so as to render it compliant with the
Equal Status Act 2000”72 by October 2011.
The Department initially accepted this recommendation but in a follow-up report
in 2012, the Ombudsman found that the scheme continued to operate unchanged
despite its illegality.73 The Department then justified its lack of action by stating
that compliancewould be too expensive. The Ombudsman dismissed this reasoning
in a follow-up report, refusing to accept that economic necessity required the state
to “infringe … the law. There are options to be considered on how best to use
scarce resources. Breaking the law is not one of those options.”74
The Ombudsman’s critique rested on accountability principles. First, the public
should be able to trust the state to act with “integrity” in areas of complexity
particularly against a background of scarce resources.75 Secondly, State agencies
should act in an open and honest way; if there is a danger that a benefit such as
the Mobility Allowance Scheme could be abolished or altered people affected
70Office of the Ombudsman,Who Cares? An investigation into the right to nursing home care in Ireland (Dublin,
Office of the Ombudsman, 2010), p.15.
71Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old to be Equal—AnOmbudsman investigation into the illegal refusal of Mobility
Allowance to people over 66 years of age (Dublin, Office of the Ombudsman, 2011).
72Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old To Be Equal (2011), p.3.
73Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old to be Equal—A follow-up (Dublin, Office of the Ombudsman, 2012), p.2.
74Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old To Be Equal—A Follow Up (2011), p.4.
75Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old To Be Equal—A Follow Up (2011), p.17.
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should be given the necessary information. Finally, the Report questioned the
State’s commitment to fundamental human rights norms. The Department of
Health’s willingness to override the fundamental principle of equality because of
cost concerns:
“suggests that it has a very weak sense of the importance of supporting human
rights principles and, indeed, a very weak sense of the rule of law and of its
obligation to act in accordance with the law.”76
The follow-up Report was published the day after the Government had
announced the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.77 Political
endorsement of the Ombudsman as a champion of the people was therefore swiftly
followed up with a high profile rebuke by that champion of a key State Department
for resistance to her recommendations. This was a fine example of political leverage
through what has been termed by one Ombudsman “the mobilisation of shame”.78
It appears, however, that the follow-up report, and a later appearance of
Department staff before the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Oversight and Petitions
in February 2013, prompted the Department to impetuously cancel the scheme
rather than make a considered attempt to bring it in line with the rule of law and
accountability principles. Twenty days after the Committee hearing the Mobility
Allowance and the Motorised Transport Grant were closed to new applicants. The
5000 existing recipients would lose their benefits four months later. The Department
restated that it had been unable to devise a lawful and effective mechanism within
their €10.6 million budget. The unilateral decision was taken without notifying
disability groups, the Ombudsman or the Joint Oireachtas Committee.
Unsurprisingly, disability groups were highly critical of this cut and as the four
months came to an end the Department agreed payments to existing recipients
should continue to “prevent hardship” and “alleviate stress, anxiety and
uncertainty”.79 It indicated an intention to establish a new statutory regime in the
area, but more than a year after the announced abolition of the schemes no
alternative proposal has yet been published. The unlawful Mobility Allowance
and the Motorised Transport Grant continue to operate.
Resistance to findings has extended beyond the Office of the Ombudsman to a
more extreme instance involving its separate sister body, the Children’s
Ombudsman in relation to a report it published in 2011 on the detention of children
in St Patrick’s Institution for Young Offenders in Dublin.80 Based on years of
investigation, and relying on concerns raised by the children detained there, the
Report considered all areas of the operation of the institution and led the Children’s
Ombudsman to call for its early closure. In her introduction, she stressed the
significance of hearing the voices of the children observing that “… there is little
76Office of the Ombudsman, Too Old To Be Equal—A Follow Up (2011), p.18.
77The report was issued on October 24, 2012.
78Marten Oosting, former Netherlands Ombudsman, quoted in R. Gregory and P. Giddings, Righting Wrongs: The
Ombudsman in Six Continents (Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2000), p.464.
79Department of Health, “InterimReport of the ReviewGroup in relation to theMobility Allowance andMotorised
Transport Grant Schemes”, June 11, 2013 at http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2013/20130611.html [Accessed May
2, 2014].
80Ombudsman for Children’s Office, Young People in St Patrick’s Institution (Dublin: Ombudsman for Children’s
Office, 2011).
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achieved if we do not convince those who come into contact with these young
people that their views are legitimate …”81
The calls for an early closure were met with little political enthusiasm, and
media coverage of the report was muted. Eighteen months later, the publication
of a damning report on the conditions in the institutions by the Inspector of Prisons,
Michael Reilly, provided an alarming indication of the attitude of the Department
of Justice and the Prison Service to the consultation carried out by the Children’s
Ombudsman.82 The Children’s Ombudsman recalled that:
“people were sneering at the outcome of that report … I was patronised
somewhat and made fun of … and made to feel that I was a bit naive in
thinking that what the young people were saying was true.”83
The view of officials was that a report by the Children’s Ombudsman, based on
the views of children in the criminal justice system, was not credible as an
authoritative analysis of the prevailing situation. The result was a refusal by those
responsible for St Patrick’s Institution to take notice of a coherent account of
fundamental problems and abuses in the detention of children.
The disruptive depth of this rejection cannot be underestimated. The experiences
of the Children’s Ombudsman extend into a lack of respect for the inquiry and
fact-finding abilities of the Office. The episodic rejection of Ombudsmen findings
challenging administrative practice underline the prevailing selective commitment
to their functioning, despite government rhetoric surrounding the 2012 Amendment
Act. It is worth contrasting the St Patrick’s Report with the selection of the
Children’s Ombudsman to investigate the removal of Roma children from their
families by Gardaí in October 2013. The Minister for Children identified the
Children’s Ombudsman as the preferred inquiry mechanism because she had
“shown herself in the past to be well capable … of doing this kind of independent
report.” 84
In the United Kingdom, the courts have sought to engender the necessary culture
of respect, by accepting, firstly, that a rejection of an Ombudsman’s
recommendations can be assessed for their lawfulness on judicial review grounds,
while secondly, in Bradley, demanding that public bodies provide “cogent reasons”
for its decision.85 Thus, as Kirkham states:
“… it is lawful for a public body to dispute the findings of an ombudsman
but it must do this in a way that pays respect to the office. This includes
directly responding to all the points in a report, rather than selectively choosing
convenient aspects of the report.”86
81Ombudsman for Children, Young People in St Patrick’s Institution (2011), p.8.
82 Inspector of Prisons, Report on an Inspection of St Patrick’s Institution by the Inspector of Prisons JudgeMichael
Reilly, 2012 at http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Appendix%20A%2005.10.pdf/Files/Appendix%20A%2005.10.pdf
[Accessed May 2, 2014].
83C. Lally, “Concerns of children’s Watchdog ‘sneered at’” Irish Times, October 18, 2012.
84 “Children’s Ombudsman has ‘trust of the public’ needed for Roma cases probe” October 26 2013, thejournal.ie
at http://www.thejournal.ie/emily-logan-trust-roma-garda-investigation-hse-1148755-Oct2013/ [Accessed May 2,
2014].
85R. (on the application of Bradley) v Secretary of State for Works and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36 at [36].
86R. Kirkham, “Implementing the recommendations of an ombudsman … again” (2011) 33(1) Journal of Social
Welfare & Family Law 71, 82.
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Beyond such specific legal bulwarks, the courts have also expressed support
for the rigour of the Office’s methodology:
“Findings… are either hard-edged findings of fact, established after thorough
and independent investigation by the [Ombudsman], or represent an
assessment by the [Ombudsman] of maladministration and injustice which,
by reason of his expertise, accumulated experience of … administration and
panoramic view of the functioning (and malfunctioning) of … government,
he is peculiarly well-equipped to make.”87
Government intervention, in recent times has also been driven towards the
financial and administrative consolidation of Ombudsmanry in Ireland. Such
interests led to the office being designated as the Information Commissioner
overseeing the otherwise separate Freedom of Information Act 1997. The more
recent McCarthy Report,88 advocated the amalgamation of bodies and claimed
duplication of work was occurring. This would result in a rationalised “single
OmbudsmanCommission” incorporating theOffice of theOmbudsman/Information
Commissioner, the Children’s Ombudsman, the Office of the Data Protection
Commissioner and theOffice of the Commission for Public Service Appointments.89
Such a range of functions, alongside the Office’s membership of the Standards in
Public Office Commission, indicate a very burdensome workload. The current
approach is largely to merge the back-office functions of the other Commissioners
into the Ombudsman’s Office. The selective emphasis upon reformingOmbudsmen
is to be queried, when there has been little mention of other fragmented bodies
such as the Office of the Appeal Commissioners for the purposes of the Tax Acts,
the various Performance Verification Bodies, appeals tribunals, as well as the
Garda and Defence Forces Ombudsmen, probably on account of a traditional
valuing of their sectoral diversity.
Re-positioning the Ombudsman: from constitutional misfit to
reform agent
How significant a role can the Ombudsman play in reinvigorating parliamentary
democracy and administrative accountability in Ireland? As noted at the outset,
the Ombudsman is often regarded as a constitutional misfit, essential in practice
but transgressive to traditional categories.90 We have seen that the Oireachtas has
failed at times to discharge its constitutional function to discourage selective
compliance with Ombudsman investigations. This leads us to the question of
constitutional recognition of the Ombudsman, which though not new, has since
the onset of the banking crises has received renewed consideration.
The Report of the Constitutional Review Group 1996 strongly endorsed the
constitutional recognition of the Office. The Review Group’s foresight is to be
praised, given the failure of the UKGovernment Green Paper on reform to provide
87R. (on the application of Gallagher) v Basildon DC [2010] EWHC 2824 at [27].
88Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (Dublin, Government
Publications Office, 2009).
89Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (2009), p.51.
90See R. Snell, “Towards an Understanding of a ConstitutionalMisfit: Four Snapshots of the Ombudsman Enigma’
in Chris Finn (ed), Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium (Canberra: AIAL, 2000), p.188.
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much importance to the institution in 2007.91 The Group found “a consensus” in
the Oireachtas “about the desirability of strengthening and developing” the Office,
extending to it the protections which exist for the Comptroller and Auditor
General.92 Constitutional recognition would, it felt:
“… reinforce freedom from conflict of interest, from deference to the
executive, from influence by special interest groups, and it would support its
ability to assemble facts and reach independent and impartial conclusions.”93
This recommendation has lain unimplemented. The First Progress Report of the
All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution provided a specific text for
inclusion in the Constitution but inertia set in. Meanwhile, within the United
Kingdom’s (admittedly unwritten) constitutional system, there have been similar
endorsements of the role of the Ombudsman in fulfilling the promise of
parliamentary democracy.94 Following the banking crisis and the Lost at Sea report,
Emily O’Reilly underlined that constitutional recognition was of renewed
relevance.95 The most recent Programme of Government of the Labour/Fine Gael
Coalition did not contain an express commitment, and the terms of reference of
the Constitutional Convention did not identify it as a priority.96 Few institutions
have received such glowing political rhetoric as the Ombudsman, but praise has
not been underpinned at the constitutional, and even governmental, level. This
underlines the political marginality of administrative reform and the institutionalised
clientelism within which many Irish politicians are habituated or strictured.
In terms of judicial engagement with the Ombudsman mechanism, there would
seem, at first glance, to be a conflict. The Irish Courts have often prioritised a
heavily judicialisedmodel of tribunals and other forms of error findingmechanisms.
The courts and theOmbudsman adopt different methodologies to resolving disputes,
and sensitivity to these differences is required within both institutions. The distinct
and essential constitutional role of Ombudsmanry was endorsed by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Re British Columbia Development Corp v Friedmann:
“[t]he powers granted to the Ombudsman allow him to address administrative
problems that the courts, the legislature and the executive cannot effectively
resolve.”97
Such judicial valuing of the working methods of the Ombudsman, have in the
absence of litigation, not appeared in Ireland.
In conceptualising the interactions of the office with the branches of Government,
describing the Ombudsman as parliament’s watchdog over an all-powerful
executive, represents an oversimplification. The Ombudsman can also be seen as
acting for the Executive in ensuring Departments implement its legislation.
91This is described by A. Abraham, “The Ombudsman as Part of the UK Constitution: A Contested Role?” 2008.
92All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, First Progress Report (Dublin: Stationery Office), 1997.
93All Party Committee, First Progress Report (1997), p.166.
94As stated by the UK Public Administration Select Committee in 2007:
“The time has come to recognise that the machinery of ethical regulation is now an integral and permanent part
of the constitutional landscape.”
Public Administration Select Committee,Ethics and Standards: The Regulation of Conduct in Public Life, (London:
The Stationary Office, 2007) HC 121-I, p.3.
95O’Reilly, “Watchdog needs State guarantee” The Sunday Times, June 5, 2011.
96 772 Dáil Deb. July 10, 2012. The Fine Gael election manifesto, did commit to constitutional recognition.
97Re British Columbia Development Corp v Friedmann (1984) 14 D.L.R. (4th) 129 at 139–40.
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Nevertheless, as we have illustrated, the Oireachtas, and its underlying
parliamentary culture, are the final bulwark for the Office when faced with
opposition. Further, in an era of legislative hyperactivity, the Ombudsman
represents a key node for ensuring that Parliament will not merely produce
legislation, but see that it is faithfully implemented and engage with the institutional
questions and practices it may well have itself produced.
In a speech entitled Executive Accountability and Parliamentary Democracy
delivered in 2011, Emily O’Reilly stressed the need for a deeper reflection on the
quality of parliament, not least:
“the dangers inherent in accepting that parliament is … a charade, that
parliamentarians have in many cases lost the sense of parliament as an
independent entity acting in the public interest. While few will acknowledge
this openly, senior civil servants working with Ministers and sitting in on
Oireachtas debates must, in very many instances, become profoundly cynical;
either that, or they too have lost the sense that a properly functioning
parliament is fundamental to a properly functioning democracy.”98
In placing these issues within the context of Ireland’s recession and the arrival
of the Troika, it is appropriate to highlight a statement of the late Brian Lenihan
TD, while Chair of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution.
Accepting that constitutional reform of the relationship between the Oireachtas
and the Executive was necessary, he stated:
“Clearly the Ombudsman is a graphic example of the pressing need for
effective oversight of Government and public administration. For a small
country like Ireland, the committee is well aware of the need to ensure the
Government has the capacity to respond speedily to challenges in the external
environment. Too sensitive a balance could lead to an enfeebled Executive.”99
At the time of the above statement, Mr Lenihan was a backbench TD, but as
Minister for Finance, he was destined to oversee themost significant, and ultimately
unsupervised, executive decisions ever taken by the Irish State.
Legislative engagement with the Ombudsman, has however, received new
institutional fora with the establishment in 2012 of the Oireachtas Joint
Sub-committee on the Ombudsman, under the wider remit of the Joint Committee
on Public Service Oversight and Petitions.100 The Committee has emphasised its
role in enhancing the accountability functions of the Oireachtas and regards
engagement with the Ombudsman as an essential part of this. Its terms of reference
therefore include a requirement that it consider the Reports of the Ombudsman
laid before the House.101 Importantly, the Committee sees itself as a “formal channel
98E. O’Reilly, Executive Accountability and Parliamentary Democracy, speech given at NUIG, March 26, 2011
at
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/News/Speeches-Articles/2011/Executive-Accountability-and-Parliamentary-Democracy.html
[Accessed May 2, 2013].
99Emphasis added. 540 Dáil Deb. col.543 (February 13, 2001).
100There is a second sub-committee on Public Petitions at http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness
/committees_list/psop-committee/ [Accessed May 2, 2014].
101Dáil Standing Orders 165A allow for the establishment of the committee and its sub-committees.
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of consultation and collaboration between the Oireachtas and the Ombudsman…
and for ensuring that its criticisms are acted upon.”102
This is an opportunity to ensure that the problems experienced in the relationship
in the past five years are not institutionalised. Some initial promise was evident
in the wake of the abolition of the mobility schemes the Committee voiced its
concern about the troubled relationship between the Ombudsman and the
Department of Health and has continued to engage with both sides. It remains to
be seen whether this greater engagement, can improve the treatment of the Office,
particularly in times of conflict.
Finally, while this article has stressed the importance of understanding the
Ombudsman’s place in institutional theory and in political culture; there is no
doubt that the personal profile and judgment of the Ombudsman are key variables
in the institution’s success. The recent election of Emily O’Reilly to the post of
European Ombudsman by the European Parliament underlines the effectiveness
of her response to the cultural resistance this article has analysed.103
Conclusion
We began this article with the statement of former Taoiseach Charles J. Haughey
justifying his opposition to the creation of an Irish Ombudsman. In describing the
casework of the Office, we have shown that it represents a distinctive forum for
complainants, often to those unable to afford litigation. Increasingly, it has supplied
leadership in developing norms of proper administration and governance, directly
communicating with decision-makers.Without constitutional recognition however,
the Ombudsman sits unsteadily on the fickle tides of underlying political culture.
An analysis of its strengths and weaknesses must ultimately move to a critique of
the broader distortions within our parliamentary democracy and regulatory patterns
within the administrative state. While the rhetorical support of many politicians
continues to be loudly stated, their political and legislative actions have not borne
out a deeper commitment to the Office and its underlying philosophies. While
ultimately we must leave the causes of this to the political judgment of the reader,
the words of another political figure, Minister Noel Dempsey, provide an
appropriate bookend:
“The most important part of the job (of public representative) is ensuring,
through our work, that the system works for every citizen, not just the ones
who come to our clinics. Public representatives shouldn’t be distracted from
their national function by constant clientelism—by becoming a hero to one
citizen through finding a way around a system when the real responsibility
is to change the system to benefit all citizens … Our state and semi-state
organisations are not scrutinised nearly enough by our national politicians,
particularly in relation to their service delivery to citizens. Because the whole
basis of what we do politically is adversarial competition, there’s little
opportunity for a collective approach to solving problems.”104
102Taoiseach, Programme for Government 2011 (2011), p.20.
103European Ombudsman press release, “Emily O’Reilly begins work as European Ombudsman” September 30,
2013 at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/51921/html.bookmark [AccessedMay 2, 2014].
104Quoted by Emily O’Reilly in her 2010 address “In the Public Interest: Lessons from the Ombudsman Experience”
given to the Institute of Public Administration, Conference on Good Governance at http://www.oic.gov.ie/en/news
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[Accessed May 2, 2014].
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